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Abstract: This paper1 scrutinizes the transformation of the European economic governance. This is a 
framework conceived by European Union decision-makers to establish institutions and processes – 
coordination and harmonisation of economic policies – in order to achieve economic and social development 
for the European Union and its citizens. Prior to the global financial crisis, the European economic 
governance was incomplete, poorly coordinated and in certain macroeconomic areas insufficient. The 
international financial crisis and the “Euro crisis” compelled a much deeper and more comprehensive 
governance structure from the decision-makers of the European Union. Despite the rapid emergence of 
Community-level crisis management mechanisms, ad hoc responses and processes prevailed till the turning 
point of the “Euro crisis” in 2012. Since then, the transformation the European economic governance 
continued in a heavily institutionalized and coordinated form, providing a long-term vision for the European 
Union and the Eurozone. European economic governance has been substantially expanded, institutional 
arrangements cover fiscal policy, monetary policy, the supervision of the financial system, policies related to 
structural and competitiveness issues. Moreover, comprehensive and coordinated reform strategies were 
launched, based on the European Commission’s priorities. In this paper, we carry out a simple analysis to 
detect whether the new European economic governance has corrected the pre-crisis country-specific risks and 
institutional flaws. 
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1 Introduction 
The European economic governance (or institutional framework of the European Union and Eurozone) 
has significantly changed since the international financial crisis. Even though the crisis originally erupted in the 
United States, due to the mismanagement of the subprime mortgage market, it rapidly developed into a full-
blown international financial crisis and spilled over into European countries. Individual (country-specific) 
responses were unable to handle properly the crisis and generated several coordination problems among 
member states. The year of 2008 was characterised by economic slowdown and in 2009 the European Union 
plunged into an unprecedented and severe recession; the average GDP of the European Union fell by 4.4% and 
apart from Poland all member states suffered from grave economic deterioration. In 2010, European countries 
hoped to forget the negative impacts of the crisis and build up a solid recovery. This was the case in most 
member states, but Greece sank into an even deeper recession due to its unsustainable fiscal developments 
which led to rapid loss of credibility and confidence on regional and global financial markets. The Greek crisis 
                                                 
1 This paper was presented at the 13th Hungarian-Romanian Round Table, Romania and Hungary in the globalised World 
and partners in the European integration, September 26, 2019. 
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generated a series of sovereign economic and debt crisis (namely the Eurozone debt crisis or the Euro crisis) in 
the Southern periphery of the Eurozone; Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus needed external financial 
assistance to revive their economies, moreover, Italy was also situated in the brink of another crisis. The global 
financial crisis and the Euro crisis have revealed the institutional weaknesses and structural problems of the 
Eurozone as well the European economic governance. Furthermore, the continuous crisis in the Southern 
periphery has defined the directions of community-level crisis management.  
Responses to the Euro crisis can be split into four macroeconomic areas. First, the European Central 
Bank deployed extraordinary and unconventional toolbox of monetary policy: covered bond purchase program, 
securities markets program, long-term refinancing operations, outright monetary transactions and finally the 
initiation of the quantitative easing. Second, community-level or institutional responses concerned the 
framework – rules, regulations, supervision and monitoring – of fiscal policy (the creation of temporary and 
permanent crisis management facilities, Six-Pack, Fiscal Compact, Two-Pack and the European Semester). 
Third, the community-level financial supervisory and regulatory system was created, which first gave rise to 
the macroprudential supervision (European Systemic Risk Board) and was followed by the launch of the 
microprudential supervisory system, namely the Banking Union. And fourth, perhaps least pronounced, there 
were implemented the European Union-wide reforms promoting competitiveness and structural reforms (Euro 
Plus Pact and certain measures of the Six Pack referring to macroeconomic imbalances) among member states. 
It is worth emphasizing that the crisis management between 2010 and 2012 was basically a series of ad hoc 
steps aimed at managing the actual crisis situations in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. Then, since the end of 
2012 it has been transformed into a much more conscious series of measures to reconstruct the economic 
governance of the Eurozone and the European Union, which intends to contemplate or finalize the institutional 
conditions for an accurately functioning Economic and Monetary Union. 
The transformation of the global financial crisis into a Euro crisis and the crisis management raise a 
number of questions, some of which are easier, while others are more difficult to answer. These questions are 
as follows in a logical order: What were the institutional and structural failures of the Economic and Monetary 
Union and the European economic governance before the two crises? What caused the prolonged crisis in the 
Southern periphery of the Eurozone? What macroeconomic processes and structural problems took place and 
emerged invisibly before the crisis; what kind of macroeconomic impacts materialized during the Euro crisis 
and what were the macroeconomic consequences of the crisis? Why was the European integration unable to 
provide fast and efficient responses to the Euro crisis? What responses did the EU decision-makers give during 
the crisis management? What institutions were created under the crisis management process and how these 
new institutions were constituted? And finally, probably the most important question, whether these new 
institutions and regulations can really correct the failures of the Eurozone’s institutional set-up and 
mechanisms, or further actions are still necessary for this? 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a short literature review of economic governance in 
general and the European economic governance. Then we turn to the empirical part of the paper, which has 
three main elements, firstly we analyse the pre-crisis governance framework of the European Union, secondly 
we show the transformation of the European economic governance as a result of the global financial crisis and 
the Euro crisis, and thirdly we identify remaining risks that will have to be tackled in the future. And in the 
final section we provide some conclusions.  
 
 
2 Economic Governance in the European Union – a short literature review 
Economic governance is a widespread terminology in economics, political science and in EU studies as 
well. In theory, economic governance ensures the proper functioning of markets, economic actions among 
actors and in general all transactions that take place in the economy. In this manner Dixit (2003, p. 449) defines 
the necessity of economic governance: “Almost all economic transactions need governance”. Scholars of 
institutional economics can provide an easy and quick answer to the question of what satisfies this need, official 
legal systems perfectly and costlessly provide this service. Based on Dixit’s (2009) approach, economic 
governance is the structure and functioning of the legal and social institutions that support and determine 
economic activities and transactions by protecting property rights, enforcing contracts and overcoming 
collective action dilemmas to administer physical and organizational infrastructure. Williamson (2005) brings 
into play a slight supplement to Dixit’s approach and defines economic governance (or more precisely 
economics of governance) as follows: “study of good order and workable arrangements” (Williamson, 2005, p. 
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1.). The addition is obviously the ordering, i.e. participants of economic actions and transactions are actively 
involved in the arrangement of good order. The rules related to ordering are always secured (and varies) by the 
state. 
The next step to our core research topic, the analysis of European economic governance, is to embed 
governance approaches in European Union studies. European Union member states have historically pooled 
important areas of policy authority to community level. The creation of these new supranational institutions at 
European Union level has significantly changed the nature of European politics and economics. Theoretically, 
institutions – supranational institutions, rules and regulations – are tools to decrease the complexity of our life, 
in terms of European Union level institutions can be understood as an apparatus to govern the processes, 
outcomes, preferences and behaviour through the maximization of relevant actors’ benefits. According to Peter 
and Pierre (2009, p. 91), the European context is slightly different because the European Union is a large 
territory with different and complex economic, social and political structures thus governance needs capacity: 
“governance implies the capacity of a society to develop some means of making and implementing collective 
choices”. The mechanism of this process starts with the identification of a common problem (common 
problems need common solutions). However, reaching common solutions is not easy and not definite, since, on 
the one hand, member states must agree and decide upon common goals and on the other hand, member states 
insist on representing their own goals and preferences. When common goals are reached, the following step is 
to design and implement the means (institutions) to achieve those purposes. And finally, an examination is also 
necessary to evaluate whether the desired goals via the means (institutions) have been achieved or not.  
In summary, institutions are the tools to reach common goals at European Union level and the whole 
set of institutions is the governance in the European Union. Through this governance, decision-makers of the 
European Union are able to influence processes, outcomes, preferences and behaviour and to guide the complex 
structure of the EU. The European Parliament’s think tank definition to economic governance is the following: 
“Economic governance refers to the system of institutions and procedures established to achieve Union 
objectives in the economic field, namely the coordination of economic policies to promote economic and social 
progress for the EU and its citizens” (EP, 2019, p. 1). In this case, the general governance starts narrowing to 
economic governance as the above-mentioned definition concentrates on the economic field and the 
coordination of economic policies. For our research purpose, this interpretation is still wide, therefore we select 
four macroeconomic areas: monetary policy, fiscal policy, financial supervision and regulation and structural 
cooperation. So, basically, we deal with a very narrow phenomenon of economic governance, namely the 
“macroeconomic governance”. 
 
 
3 Methodology and empirical research 
In the empirical part of our paper, we analyse the transformation of the institutional structure 
(macroeconomic governance) of the Economic and Monetary Union and the European Union. The global 
financial crisis almost splits the last 20 years of the Eurozone; thus, we can investigate separately the pre-crisis 
institutional structure and the post-crisis one, moreover the separable periods can also be evaluated in a 
comparative manner. Nevertheless, neither the institutional structure of the pre-crisis period nor the institutional 
structure of the post-crisis period can be considered as static. 
The steps of the analysis are the followings: first, we show the European Union’s institutional 
framework of the pre-crisis period, what were the objectives and the related economic governance tools 
between 1999 and the global financial crisis; second, we exhibit the transformation of the European economic 
governance as a result of the global financial crisis and the Euro crisis; and third, we compare the pre-crisis and 
post-crisis risks to evaluate capabilities of the European economic governance to prevent and manage future 
crises.  
 
3.1 European economic governance before the global financial crisis 
During the pre-crisis period, the tools of the European economic governance were limited. The pre-
crisis institutional set-up was built-up on two major pillars and on some “soft” coordination mechanism. In this 
regard, Table 1 depicts the pre-crisis economic governance of the European Union. National monetary policies 
were delegated to supranational level to the European Central Bank and the European System of Central Banks, 
and fiscal policy remained decentralized but coordinated by the Stability and Growth Pact. 
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The primary objective of the European Central Bank was and is to achieve price stability, the inflation rate of 
2% or below. As a secondary objective, without compromising price stability, the Eurosystem supports general 
economic policies in the European Union (more accurately in the Eurozone) such as economic growth, 
competitiveness, employment, social development and the protection of environment. 
The second pillar was the creation of rule-based fiscal policy in the European Union. On the one hand, 
the Maastricht Treaty limits government deficits to 3% of GDP and public debt levels to 60% of GDP in order 
to enable countries to introduce the single currency. The fiscal provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, following 
German interest, were institutionalized under the Stability and Growth Pact to strengthen monitoring and 
coordination of national fiscal and economic policies to enforce the deficit and debt limits instituted by the 
Maastricht Treaty. The Stability and Growth Pact’s preventive arm ensures sound budgetary policies over the 
medium term. And the corrective arm (namely the Excessive Deficit Procedure) deals with non-compliance of 
sound public finances. Under the Excessive Deficit Procedure, if a member state breaches the 3% budget deficit 
ceiling the Council will issue recommendations to address this problem (suggestions to reach the 3% threshold) 
and finally may lead to sanctions. In 2005, the Stability and Growth Pact was reformed by European Union 
decision-makers. Germany and France, as a consequence of large-scale structural reforms, were unable to 
satisfy the fiscal provisions and were allowed to run excessive in multiple years without any sanctions. The new 
Stability and Growth Pact better considers country-specific circumstances and strengthens surveillance and 
coordination of national fiscal policies. Moreover, the Excessive Deficit Procedure was also amended to easier 
and faster respond to non-compliance.  
The Single European Act – the principle of four freedoms – ensures also the free movement of capital 
among member states of the European Union, which contributed to the deepening of financial integration. 
Nevertheless, in the area of financial supervision, regulation and monitoring there was no appropriate 
institution or rule to reach financial stability. European Union decision-makers missed to govern this area; 
however, a few institutional elements were added to the pre-crisis economic governance structure to promote 
the sound functioning of European financial markets. The Financial Services Action Plan harmonized financial 
services – extended the scope of the Single European Act – and created a single market for financial services. 
Furthermore, the regulatory structure of the single market for financial services was initiated by the Lamfalussy 
Process, the approach first controlled the securities market and then banking, insurance, pension and asset 
management markets. And finally, the European Union took over both the Basel I and Basel II regulations to 
govern banking sectors. 
In addition to the above-mentioned macroeconomic components of economic governance, several non-
effective and non-binding institutions and tools were added to the pre-crisis economic governance framework 
of the European Union: Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and guidelines for employment policies; Cardiff 
Process; Open Method of Coordination (social policy); European Macroeconomic Dialogue, and European 
Social Dialogue (Heise, 2012). Since these institutions and initiatives were non-binding for the member states, 
they served only for information exchange and loose connection of sectoral national policies, particularly in the 
fields of structural, social and employment policies. It is worth noting that the above-mentioned enumeration of 
soft governance tools was supplemented with a horizontal long-term project of the European Union, the 
Lisbon Strategy that aimed to transform the community into the most competitive region in the world.  
Table 1: Pre-crisis economic governance in the European Union 
Fields Fiscal policy Monetary policy Financial regulation Soft economic governance 
Objectives Sustainable and stable public finances Price stability Financial stability 
Harmonisation and 
exchange of 
information 
Institutions  
• Stability and 
Growth Pact 
• Reformed 
Stability and 
Growth Pact 
• Conventional 
instruments of the 
European Central 
Bank 
• Missing 
institutions and 
regulations; 
• "Soft" financial 
instruments: 
Financial 
Services Action 
Plan and the 
Lamfalussy 
Process 
• External tools: 
• Lisbon Strategy: 
Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines 
and guidelines for 
employment 
policies 
• Cardiff Process 
• Open Method of 
Coordination 
(social policy) 
• European 
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Fields Fiscal policy Monetary policy Financial regulation Soft economic governance 
Basel I and Basel 
II regulations.  
Macroeconomic 
Dialogue 
• European Social 
Dialogue 
Source: Own compilation. 
 
3.2 European economic governance during the post-crisis period 
In the late 2000s, the Economic and Monetary Union (and the European Union) faced the most severe 
challenge of its existence so far; the global financial crisis and the subsequent Euro crisis have revealed a 
significant number of problems: the asymmetrical institutional structure of the monetary union (namely the 
delegation of the monetary policy to Community level and rule-based but discretionary fiscal policy), poor or 
inadequate economic governance and powerless regulatory systems (weak enforcement of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, the adverse rules of the common monetary policy and the missing regulation of the financial and 
banking system), strong core-periphery dichotomy in terms of market economy, welfare and social structures, 
large and probably unmanageable heterogeneity among member states and many other problems.  
In general, the European economic governance is made up of four closely interrelated building 
blocks: monitoring of national economic policies, prevention, correction and enforcement. The European 
Commission regularly monitors macroeconomic developments of member states as well as global economic 
trends. The significance of this process is to detect macroeconomic problems, unsustainable macroeconomic 
trends and changes in member states’ competitiveness. The economic governance framework has been 
organized into annual cycles under the European Semester. European institutions and bodies, and national 
governments must carry out tasks related to macroeconomic and budgetary areas in specific times and in 
specific order. The essence of the European Semester is to coordinate national economic policies: sound public 
finances, avoiding substantial macroeconomic imbalances, implementing structural reforms and facilitating 
economic growth and employment.  
The role of the European Central Bank has significantly been strengthened after the global 
financial crisis and during the Euro crisis; the two crises forced the European Central Bank to act much more 
actively in the real economy. This activity no longer aimed at achieving a stable inflationary environment, but 
rather the functioning and the stability of the whole Eurozone economy. The European Central Bank has 
increasingly focused on the use of non-conventional instruments in an environment where depressed inflation 
and historically low interest rates were perceived as an external condition. Thus, the application of non-
conventional monetary measures is understandable to cope effectively with tasks such as cleaning-up the 
transmission mechanism channels, boosting economic recovery in crisis-ridden member states and supporting 
financial stability through large-scale refinancing programs to commercial banks. Among several measures that 
were adopted by the European Central Bank, it is worth highlighting the role of Outright Monetary 
Transactions: under this measure the European Central Bank officially announced that it would buy 
government-issued bonds in secondary sovereign bond markets to safeguard an appropriate monetary policy 
transmission and to preserve the Eurozone. By this measure, the European Central Bank has de facto fulfilled 
the lender of last resort function vis-á-vis the member states of the Eurozone. 
Since the eruption of the Eurozone crisis, European decision-makers have significantly strengthened 
the fiscal framework of the European Union and the Eurozone. The engineering of new fiscal governance has 
taken place at two interconnected levels, the first, rule-based continuously strengthening fiscal regulations and 
the second, the creation of a permanent firewall to assist Eurozone sovereigns. The Six-Pack was introduced in 
2011 and aimed to develop and strengthen the Stability and Growth Pact by ensuring the viability of national 
public finances through either preventive and corrective actions and to reduce macroeconomic imbalances of 
member states. They apply to all EU member states, but some rules apply only to the Eurozone countries. An 
intergovernmental agreement, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance aka Fiscal Compact, was 
added to the fiscal governance framework in 2012 (and entered into force from January 2013)2. The Fiscal 
Compact is a clear step towards a “fiscal stability union” by further strengthening fiscal rules of the European 
Union and the Eurozone. Moreover, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance contains a second 
and a third pillar above the Fiscal Compact. The second pillar bolsters economic governance and convergence 
                                                 
2 The Czech Republic and the United Kingdom decided to not participate in the agreement.  
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among Eurozone member states, while the third pillar covers the governance of the Eurozone with the 
formulation of the Euro Summit. And finally, the “Two-Pack” also enhances the Six-Pack reforms by 
improving budgetary coordination via the introduction of a common budgetary timeline and a system of 
enhanced surveillance. 
Prior to the early 2010s, when several Eurozone member states suffered from economic meltdown or 
default, the economic governance framework of the European Union or the Eurozone lacked a permanent 
firewall or a rescue mechanism for sovereigns because of the strict “no bail-out clause”. When Greece officially 
requested financial assistance from the European Union, and as the Euro crisis spread over and escalated 
among periphery Eurozone member states, decision makers of the European Union had no other choice than to 
establish temporarily and then permanently a firewall to provide financial assistance to crisis-ridden member 
states and to prevent the disintegration of the Eurozone. First, two temporary financing programmes were 
introduced: the European Financial Stability Mechanism and the European Financial Stability Facility. These 
temporary measures were unable to stop contagion in the Eurozone periphery so a further and permanent 
firewall, namely the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was created by melting the temporary mechanisms 
into one. The European Stability Mechanism is an intergovernmental organization, which operates under the 
ESM treaty, ratified by all Eurozone member states. 
European crisis management between 2010 and 2012 heavily concentrated on monetary and fiscal 
policies. Then, responding the global financial crisis, decision makers of the European Union created a 
macroprudential supervisory body, the European Systemic Risk Board, to regularly monitor systemic risks of 
regional financial markets. Concepts for the Banking Union were launched at the end of 2012 and negotiations 
started in 2013 to introduce a microprudential supervisory body. The Banking Union is based on three pillars 
(Single Supervisory Mechanism, Single Resolution Mechanism and the European Deposit Insurance Scheme) 
and the Single Rulebook covering the stipulations for financial actors. 
Reforms aiming at boosting competitiveness and structural reforms were neglected in the pre-crisis 
period. The institutional engineering during crisis management has produced two different instruments to deal 
with the obstacles of competitiveness and structural reforms: Euro Plus Pact and provisions regarding 
macroeconomic imbalance under the Six-Pack. In 2010, 24 member states adopted an intergovernmental 
agreement (Euro Plus Pact or Competitiveness Pact) to enhance structural reforms (improve competitiveness, 
employment, financial stability and fiscal stance of participating countries). In parallel, the Six-Pack introduced 
the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure in order to identify, prevent and address the emergence of adverse 
macroeconomic imbalances that could negatively affect economic stability in a member state, or the European 
Union as a whole. The following table summarises the changes in the economic governance framework of the 
European Union.  
Table 2: Post-crisis European economic governance framework 
Fields Fiscal policy Monetary policy Financial supervision and regulation 
Other Areas 
(structural policies 
and competitiveness) 
Objectives 
Sustainable and stable 
public finances; 
Permanent firewall 
and assistance 
mechanism for 
member states 
Price stability; 
Supporting national 
economic policies; 
The effectiveness of 
monetary 
transmission 
mechanism; 
„preserve or save the 
euro” 
Financial stability; 
Macroprudential and 
microprudential supervisory 
system; 
Institutionalized and 
predictable bank 
consolidation 
Monitoring of 
macroeconomic 
imbalances; 
Fostering 
competitiveness; 
Enforcing the 
implementation of 
structural reforms 
Institutions  
• European 
Semester; 
• Six-Pack (fiscal 
provisions); 
• Fiscal Compact – 
TSCG); 
• Two-Pack; 
• European 
Stability 
Mechanism  
• Non-
conventional 
measures of the 
ECB; 
• Accommodative 
monetary policy; 
• „whatever it 
takes”; 
• De facto lender 
of last resort 
• European Systemic 
Risk Board; 
• Banking Union 
o Single Supervisory 
Mechanism, 
o Single Resolution 
Mechanism, 
o European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme; 
• "Soft" financial 
• Six-Pack 
(macroeconomic 
imbalances); 
• Euro Plus Pact;  
• Europe 2020 
Strategy 
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Fields Fiscal policy Monetary policy Financial supervision and regulation 
Other Areas 
(structural policies 
and competitiveness) 
instruments 
• External tool: Basel III 
regulations 
Source: Own compilation. 
 
3.3 Analysis of pre-crisis and post-crisis risks and solutions 
On the one hand, deficiencies and flaws can be identified in the entire institutional structure of the euro 
area, and on the other hand, some areas have intentionally been uncoordinated at Community level in the pre-
crisis period. In the case of monetary policy, it is worth pointing out that the European Central Bank's mandate 
has been limited, providing price stability has been primordial, while the promotion of member states’ general 
economic policies has only appeared as a secondary and a non-exercised objective. Because of the prohibition 
of monetary financing, the European Central Bank cannot fulfil the role of lender of last resort de jure, so it 
cannot provide active insurance against crises for member states. In addition, another problem is that EU 
decision-makers did not create an exit strategy for member states to leave the fixed exchange rate regime (this 
became a crucial issue during the Greek crisis). During the pre-crisis period, the credibility of Eurozone 
membership, measured by financial actors and credit rating agencies, led to excessive lending in the Eurozone 
periphery and generated deeper economic downturn as a result of the global financial crisis. The post-crisis 
period can be characterized with the revival of monetary policy, particularly the application of non-
conventional monetary policy measures. Thus, the European Central Bank has become a de facto lender of last 
resort, however, it is not allowed to de jure undertake this role due to Treaty regulations. Finally, the 
transmission channel of monetary policy is still unclear, so the European Central Bank is likely to maintain 
zero-bound interest rates and apply non-conventional measures in the future.  
The regulatory framework regarding fiscal policy has also suffered from several mistakes. Member 
states – with more or less success – focused on to satisfy the Maastricht criteria deficit target, instead of 
following the underlying objective of the Pact to reach close-to-balance budgetary position or even budgetary 
surplus. Moreover, the Pact was not induced strong (or at least weak) convergence among member states’ fiscal 
policies. Even if member countries satisfied the obligatory deficit target, they had different fiscal stances, 
national characteristics of the fiscal policies were maintained such as: different structure of the expenditure and 
revenue side, social and welfare systems, tax systems, efficient taxation, etc. And thirdly, the Stability and 
Growth Pact did not stipulate strict rules on the reduction of government debt levels. The new European 
economic governance framework has initiated several alterations: firewall for sovereigns, strengthened fiscal 
governance (monitoring, prevention, corrections and enforcement) and excessive deficit procedure on the basis 
of public debt. But on the other hand, there is no fiscal union (mutualisation of public debt and deeper fiscal 
redistribution among member states of the Eurozone) and austerity measures have had grave negative impacts 
on welfare in crisis-ridden member states.  
There are two further aspects of member states’ public finances where flaws can be identified: the 
public finances and structural reforms nexus and the poisonous relationship between sovereign member states 
and the financial system (namely the vicious circle). In the former case, the revised version of the Stability and 
Growth Pact took into consideration the situations of structural reforms. At the same time, decision-makers of 
the European Union missed to initiate bold measures or efficient institutions for the promotion of structural 
reforms among member states, and ‘soft’ governance initiatives have failed to accomplish this task. Regarding 
the latter, in the vicious circle, the separation of sovereign debt crises and banking crises has not been 
institutionalized and moreover, there was no legal base (no bailout clause) for providing financial assistance to 
Eurozone member states and parallelly, there were no institutional elements for rescuing banks. The launch of 
the Economic and Monetary Union created a monetary pillar and a half-built economic pillar based on the 
single market for the Eurozone but the fiscal pillar (fiscal union) and/or financial pillar (financial or banking 
union) have not been established. The Euro Plus Pact and non-fiscal provisions of the Six-Pack are attempts to 
foster structural reforms and competitiveness of member states but these attempts are powerless to generate 
large-scale structural reforms and decrease the heterogeneity of the European Union as well the Eurozone. The 
existing elements of the Banking Union tackle the question of monitoring, supervision and regulation; however, 
the European Resolution Fund is not ready to deal with multiple banking crises.  
Table 3: Incompleteness of European economic governance 
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Fields Fiscal Policy Monetary Policy Financial supervision and regulation Other fields 
Pre-crisis 
institutional 
structure  
• Stability and Growth 
Pact; 
• Reformed Stability 
and Growth Pact 
• conventional 
policies of the 
European 
Central Bank 
• There is no effective 
tool 
• "Soft" institutions such 
as Lamfalussy 
Process; 
• External tools: Basel I 
and Basel II  
• Lisbon Strategy; 
• „Soft” governance 
Pre-crisis 
risks 
• Fiscal imbalances; 
• Problems with public 
debt levels 
• No firewall for 
sovereigns 
• Wrong growth 
models (real-
estate bubble) 
• Inflation 
persistence 
• Financial strains; 
• Vicious circle; 
• No firewall for banks 
• Structural 
imbalances; 
• Lack of structural 
reforms 
• Competitiveness 
problems 
New 
institutional 
structure 
• European Semester; 
• Stability and Growth 
Pact’s reform 
• Six-Pack (fiscal parts); 
• Fiscal Compact 
(Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and 
Governance); 
• Two-Pack; 
• European Stability 
Mechanism 
• non-
conventional 
policies; 
• Accommodative 
monetary 
policy; 
• „whatever it 
takes”; 
• De facto lender 
of last resort 
for sovereigns 
• European Systemic 
Risk Board; 
• Banking Union 
o Single 
Supervisory 
Mechanism 
o Single 
Resolution 
Mechanism 
o European 
Deposit 
Insurance 
Scheme*; 
• External tool: Basel 
III. 
• Six Pack 
(supervision of 
macroeconomic 
imbalances): 
Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure 
Excessive Imbalance 
Procedure 
• Euro Plus Pact 
• Europe 2020 
Strategy 
Remaining 
risks 
• Fiscal imbalances 
• Austerity, depressed 
growth forecasts 
• Lack of fiscal 
redistribution 
mechanism 
• Negative welfare and 
distributional impacts 
of austerity 
• The European 
Central Bank is 
not a de jure 
lender of last 
resort. 
• Weak monetary 
transmission 
• Capitalization of the 
Single Resolution 
Fund is still in 
progress; 
• No European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme 
• Weak lending activity 
• “Coordinated” 
structural 
imbalances; 
• Lack of deep 
structural reforms; 
• Heterogeneity; 
• Competitiveness 
problems 
Source: Own compilation base on the financial and economic assistance programmes of the European Commission 
(European Commission, 2010; 2011a; 2011b; 2012a; 2012b; 2013; 2017a). 
 
The identified risks ‘enforce’ two types of activity from the decision-makers of the European Union. 
The first one is the creation of firewall tools (risk-sharing institutions and instruments), the second one is the 
steps that ensure fiscal rigor and coordination and harmonization of macroeconomic policies at Community 
level (risk reduction rules and regulations). These activities went hand in hand in the time of crisis 
management. 
 
 
4 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have thoroughly analysed the evolution of the instruments of the European economic 
governance in four macroeconomic areas, monetary policy, fiscal policy, financial supervision and regulation 
and structural policies. The institutional framework or macroeconomic governance of the Eurozone is still 
evolving and becoming increasingly complex. Community level responses to the global financial crisis and the 
Euro crisis have eventuated in introducing a significant number of new institutional elements. Risk reduction 
institutions – fiscal regulations such as “Six Pack”, Fiscal Compact, “Two Pack”, supervision of 
macroeconomic imbalances, Euro Plus Pact, the macroprudential supervisory system (European Systemic Risk 
Board) and partially the microprudential supervision (the first pillar of the Banking Union, the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism) – are all aimed at reducing the probability of future crises. If crises are inevitable, 
risk-sharing institutions (the European Stability Mechanism, the Single Resolution Mechanism and the 
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European Central Bank as de facto lender of last resort) can be used to mitigate the negative impacts of the 
crises and to boost rapid recovery. The future set-up of European economic governance is not yet known, the 
Five Presidents’ Report (Juncker et al., 2015) and the Reflection Paper of the European Commission (European 
Commission, 2017b) contain detailed information and radical ideas on it. Thus, the research topic of ‘European 
economic governance’ is going to provide an excellent and interesting field for economics and political science 
scholar in the future. 
Summarizing, we have displayed the transformation of the European economic governance; even 
though this framework has substantially been reinforced with risk-sharing and risk reduction institutions, 
instruments, rules and regulations, however it is still incomplete. Nevertheless, a future crisis will test this 
framework, and scholars will have enough information to evaluate the efficiency, resilience and depth of the 
new European economic governance.  
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